Too Long at the Fair: Time to retire the US/Emerging Markets barbell for a while
Summary. I have recommended since 2009 that equity investors overweight the US and Emerging Markets, and underweight Europe and Japan. The excess returns from such a strategy when applied to regional MSCI equity indexes have been enormous over that time frame. However, the time has come to retire the barbell for a while. I stayed too long at the fair, and should have made this recommendation a few months ago when Europe was trading at a record 35% P/E discount to the US. A modestly brighter picture in Japan relative to China is another reason why it’s time to put the barbell aside for now.
[1] The barbell’s amazing run. The barbell’s performance since 1988 is shown in the first two charts using both a three-year and two-year performance horizon. Before its underperformance this year, the barbell had a remarkable streak1. In other words, the -120 bps of barbell underperformance over the last two years is small relative to the consistency and magnitude of prior barbell outperformance. Note that the worst period for the barbell was the golden era for Europe in 2005-2007; more on that below.
[3] What’s been driving recent barbell underperformance. Since September 2022, Europe has outperformed the US by ~20%. As shown below, 2/3 of this outperformance is due simply to the decline in the dollar vs the Euro. As we wrote last time (see Archives), while we do not see the dollar’s reserve currency status under serious threat, there’s room for the dollar to decline due to its prior sharp rise vs other currencies.
What else explains Europe’s outperformance? The other positive for Europe: outperformance of its Consumer Discretionary stocks vs US counterparts. The next largest factor: relative outperformance of EU financials, but it’s small in the context of overall European outperformance. That gap may widen further given US regional bank commercial real estate exposure, which we wrote about on April 10. But I’m reluctant to base a long Europe strategy on the reported strength of its banks. The April 10 Eye on the Market also showed how Credit Suisse ranked at or near the top of EU bank statistics on capital, leverage, liquidity and funding ratios and still failed. Certain risks are just hard to capture in balance sheet ratios.
What explains Japan’s 11% outperformance vs EM since last fall? One factor is a resurgence in M&A activity in Japan, which is unusual. Much of the recent rise comes from foreign investors, which is even rarer: Bain’s acquisitions of Hitachi Metals for $5.6 bn, Evident for $3.1 bn and Gelato Pique for $1.4 bn; KKR’s acquisition of Hitachi Transport for $5.2 bn; and the Fortress acquisition of Seven & i for $1.8 bn. More on Japan below.
Japanese equities may benefit from the following catalysts:
- Japanese equities trade at 25%-30% P/E discount to US, as they have since 2016
- Record increase in stock buybacks driven by corporate governance reforms (i.e., Sony spinoff/buyback)
- Governance reforms: [a] ~50% of companies trade below book value and must outline a plan to maximize shareholder value and comply with shareholder, liquidity and outside director reforms; [b] 10%-20% of companies do not comply with cross-holding and free float criteria and must remedy or face delisting
- Half of Japanese companies have positive net cash positions vs <20% in the US/Europe
- Very low positioning in Japanese equities by non-Japanese investors
- A recent surge in non-Japanese LBO activity in Japan, which is extremely rare (discussed earlier)
- Lower wage pressures than US/Europe, COVID supply chain pressures easing
- Earnings expected to be flat vs contractions in the US and Europe
- The lowest real effective exchange rate in Japan in 50 years according to CEIC; the Yen has also depreciated by 30% vs the Chinese RMB, which is relevant since Japan now exports more to China than to the US
1 Professor Elroy Dimson estimates that US equities outperformed non-US markets by ~2% per year from 1900 to 2021, which translates into very large cumulative excess returns. For most of this period, higher dividends explained the difference; since 1990, higher US valuations has been the dominant factor. Jack Bogle argues that excess US returns are not random and reflect US exceptionalism with respect to deeper markets and rule of law.
2 Our European P/E charts start in 2006. Before 2006, IFRS accounting standards required European companies to amortize goodwill, and the amounts involved were at times substantial. As a result, pre-2006 P/E multiples for Europe are not comparable to post-2006 multiples, and can distort time series comparisons vs the US.
3 Yellen says it would be a calamity not to raise the debt ceiling. I wonder how she would describe the charts in our Jan 24 piece on inflation adjusted debt per capita since 1790, and on the collapse in discretionary spending due to rising entitlements. Those look like calamities too.